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Until recently, it was unclear whether there is an identifiable “trait” that represents a person’s 
vulnerability to developing false memories. Two articles in the current issue (Patihis, Frenda, 
& Loftus, this issue; Bernstein, Scoboria, Desjarlais, & Soucie, this issue) find scant 
evidence that performance on any one false memory task could reliably predict performance 
on another. Individual difference measures also were poor predictors of false memories, 
consistent with past research. I argue that these findings, and other converging evidence, 
suggest there is no false memory trait, that all people are susceptible to false memories, and 
that memory distortions likely arise from brain structures and mechanisms common to all 
people. Accepting the idea that all people are susceptible to false memories, and not just the 
25 percent or so who typically report a false memory in any single study, has important 
implications for preventing memory distortions in psychotherapy and other settings. In this 
article, I also propose the Dual Encoding Interference hypothesis that explains why trait-like 
individual difference measures typically correlate negligibly with false memory tasks. 
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Why there is No False Memory Trait and Why Everyone is Susceptible to Memory 
Distortions: The Dual Encoding Interference Hypothesis 
Given that the narrative that some people are especially susceptible to false memories 
originated from bold speculation more than a century ago (e.g. Bernheim, 1900/1884; Freud 
1928/2001), and it appears to be difficult to shake the idea, let me be so bold to question 
whether a false memory “trait” exists. We might ask whether there is a trait—a “false memory 
proneness” if you will—that predicts consistently higher rates of false memories over time and 
across tasks.  Put another way, is it the case that the reason we find that about a quarter of 
participants succumb to false memories in studies of memory distortion means that these 
participants are false memory prone, and that three-quarters of the population are not 
susceptible to false memories? In this commentary, I argue that there is no false memory trait, 
that 100% of individuals are prone to false memories, and that predicting who will have a false 
memory based on a trait is therefore difficult, if not impossible. I will also introduce the Dual 
Encoding Interference hypothesis to explain why trait-like individual differences do not 
predict false memories very well in the misinformation research. 
More than a century ago Hippolyte Bernheim (1900/1884) was one of a group of 
hypnotists and physicians who speculated that false memory production might be related to an 
internal tendency in an individual. He wrote: 
We have observed that certain subjects capable of being hypnotized are susceptible to 
illusions or varying hallucinations by simple affirmation in the waking condition 
without the necessity of re-hypnotizing them. They are also susceptible to retroactive 
hallucinations (p. 166). 
Bernheim goes on to suggest that this susceptibility to false memory may be measurable, 
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commenting that one “can measure the suggestibility of a doubtful witness by a process of 
clever questioning” (p. 178). I call this assumption into question, given current research, 
because it assumes that by measuring suggestibility in one setting, it will be possible to predict 
false recollection in another setting or circumstance. Sigmund Freud, influenced by the 
hypnotist schools in France, continued to advance the general idea that people with certain 
tendencies produce false memories by writing: “there is reason to distrust the autobiographical 
statements of neurotics. Experience shows that their memories introduce falsifications” (Freud 
2001; originally written 1928; p. 2717). 
  This framing of false memories as an inherent characteristic of a minority of people has 
persisted to the present day. For example, Brewin and Andrews (2017) reviewed the literature 
and concluded that, when using stringent definitions, an average of only about 15% of 
participants in memory distortion studies experience what they categorized as a genuine false 
memory. Though this percentage is a measure of occurrence at a particular point in time in 
relation to a particular task, they make the error of relating this finding to a more 
encompassing susceptibility to false memories, implying that only a minority of individuals 
are vulnerable to false memories. They write that “susceptibility to false memories of 
childhood events appears more limited than has been suggested” (p. 2). Brewin and Andrews 
continue the conflation of occurrence of a false memory and more general vulnerability to 
false memories later by stating that “susceptibility to false memories appears to be lower than 
has often previously been suggested” (p. 20). They repeat this framing by stating that “it 
cannot be concluded” that “the majority of individuals are susceptible” to false memories (p. 
20). Here, I point out that even if only an average of 15% of people exhibit a false memory in 
a given study, it does not mean 85% of people are not susceptible to false memories on other 
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occasions or under other circumstances.  In other words, the 15% statistic gauges occurrence 
on one particular point in time, not a propensity to false memories more generally, so one 
might more circumspectly state that  85% of people did not evidence a memory error on this 
particular occasion of assessment.  Brain structures, mechanisms, and cognitive processes 
pertinent to the creation of false memories will still engender vulnerability in the future to 
memory distortions, consonant with the reconstructive nature of memory. I argue that the 
complex interaction and interferences of attention and memory during numerous events results 
in false memory production that is not possible to robustly predict in relation to a trait or 
individual difference. 
I advance this assertion because there exists converging evidence against the idea that 
false memory proneness (or susceptibility, if you will) is a moderate or large factor in the 
prediction of memory distortions. Patihis, Frenda, and Loftus (2017) and Bernstein, Scoboria, 
Desjarlais, and Soucie (2017) both found negligible-to-low relationships between different 
types of false memories (e.g., misinformation and DRM words lists: r = .05 meta-analytic 
average in Bernstein et al., Table 4) and between individual difference measures and memory 
distortions (e.g., fantasy proneness and misinformation: r = .08, in Bernstein et al.). These 
authors also reviewed past research that converges on a similar conclusion. Given past and 
current research, exceptions to these negligible-to-low effects should be replicated to mitigate 
false positive reporting in this domain (cf. Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011).  
The research presented and reviewed in this issue is also reinforced by our increasing 
understanding of how false memories form, in terms of cognitive mechanisms related to 
specific brain structures (e.g., Okado, & Stark, 2005; McDermott, Gilmore, Nelson, Watson, 
& Ojemann, 2017), and that memory malleability springs from evolutionary adaptive 
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cognitive processes (Schacter, Guerin, & Jacques, 2011). If it were adaptive in evolutionary 
history for memory to be malleable, then it could well be a universal property of human minds, 
as I argue here. If that were the case, then we would expect to find susceptibility to memory 
distortions even in individuals with superior memory, and we do (Patihis et al., 2013). The 
argument is that we all use these mechanisms or cognitive processes, and we all have similar 
neural nets and brain structures that arise in part from our genetic code. If we all use these 
mechanisms in forming memories, then all people should be susceptible, and that conclusion 
fits with the evidence in this issue, alongside previous research. 
The above argument addresses why all people are likely to be susceptible to false 
memories. Another related finding in the current issue and in past research is that individual 
differences measures do not correlate very strongly with false memory occurrence in research 
involving post-event misinformation. This seems to be true even of trait-like measures of 
characteristics that theoretically should enhance encoding (for example absorption). To 
explain this, I put forward the Dual Encoding Interference (DEI) hypothesis (see Figure 1). 
The DEI explanation builds on the fact that there are two encoding events in the 
misinformation effect, and this has a flattening effect on the relationship between false 
memories and trait-measures and other individual differences. The DEI explanation goes as 
follows:  
(1) The misinformation effect involves two encoding stages (the original event and 
misinformation stage; hence the term dual encoding). 
(2) Traits that could enhance encoding will strengthen both the memory of the original 
event and misinformation. Conversely, those who possess low levels of the trait will exhibit 
weak encoding of both the original event and the misinformation presented. 
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(3) For individuals who score high on a trait that enhances encoding, a strongly 
encoded event is matched with strong retroactive interference from the misinformation stage 
memory. When both the event and misinformation are encoded with similar strength, there is a 
potential for source monitoring errors at the time of retrieval. This interference between the 
original event and misinformation yields a middling probability of false memory formation, 
despite better than average encoding of events (c.f., Patihis et al., 2013; Merckelbach, 2004). 
Conversely, individuals who possess low levels of the trait will encode misinformation weakly 
that interferes with a weak event memory. This state of affairs results in two equally weak 
memory traces that could produce interference and cause source monitoring errors, thus 
yielding roughly similar probabilities of false memory formation compared with individuals 
who score high on the trait. 
--INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE-- 
To illustrate this further, Figure 1 uses absorption as an example of a trait that is 
theoretically and empirically likely to strengthen encoding (see Patihis, 2016; Tellegen & 
Atkinson, 1974). This figure and DEI explanation also apply to other variables that could 
potentially produce differences in encoding strength (e.g., fantasy proneness: see Merckelbach, 
2004, dissociation, working memory, attention). Shown to the right of Figure 1, individuals 
who become highly absorbed in new experiences are likely to encode the event and the 
misinformation strongly, which leads to the misinformation interfering strongly with the event 
memory. This produces an average or middling probability of false memories. To the left of 
Figure 1, those who tend to not become absorbed in new experiences encode both the event 
and misinformation weakly, leading to similar source monitoring problems at test, and leading 
to similar rates of false memories compared with those who score high on absorption. 
FALSE MEMORY TRAIT  6 
Conversely, the DEI hypothesis also predicts that the likelihood of false memories will 
increase if the event is encoded weakly but the misinformation is encoded strongly.  
Nevertheless, this combination is unlikely to be consistently related to a stable trait or 
tendency. This mismatched combination is likely to happen independent of personal traits and 
will result in false memory production that is difficult to predict and which appears pseudo-
random.  
The argument in this commentary has important implications for how we view 
memory in the courtroom and in psychotherapy. More specifically, the misguided idea that 
some people are not susceptible to false memories could lead to a disregard of the impact of 
memory contamination in both arenas and to the acceptance or legitimization of techniques 
that distort memory among individuals who are believed to be less susceptible to memory 
distortion.  This argument also plays a role in the debate between the trauma-model of 
dissociation and the fantasy model of dissociation (Dalenberg et al., 2012; Lynn et al., 2014). 
If false memories do not consistently correlate with individual differences, such as 
dissociation and fantasy proneness, then the strongest alternative argument against the trauma 
model of dissociation has to shift from the idea that dissociation and fantasy proneness are 
major predictors of false memories to an argument that everyone is susceptible to false 
memories. Readers will notice that both the trauma and fantasy model involve linking some 
kind of pathology or unusual characteristic to those who have purportedly repressed memories 
(i.e., the pathology associated with severe repressed trauma in the trauma model) or to those 
who experience false memories (i.e., the pathology or unusual characteristics of people with 
high levels of fantasy proneness or dissociation in the fantasy model). I suggest that we move 
away from a pathological view of false memory production. Indeed, it may be the case that 
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those who report purported repressed memories or who experience false memories in therapy 
are less damaged or “different” than previously thought.  Such people then become less of an 
out-group curiosity and more of an uncomfortable reminder of how we are all vulnerable to 
the same processes that produce false memories. 
After early theorists—such as Bernheim and Freud—were so bold as to infect us with 
the century-long narrative that a group of people are especially false memory prone, let me be 
so bold as to correct the narrative and state simply that there is no such thing as a false 
memory trait. I was motivated to find it, as others were, we searched proverbially high and 
low for it, yet we could not find compelling evidence for it. Part of the delay in establishing a 
consensus on this matter is that we may have been the undervaluing research that does not 
have p-values under .05, a file-drawer problem, and difficulties in publishing research articles 
such as the two in this issue. To some in the field, the universality of the cognitive 
mechanisms that facilitate memory distortions, and thus the universality of susceptibility to 
false memories, is merely stating the obvious—something they appreciated long ago. To 
others they may view the idea of universal susceptibility as wrong or as speculation that can 
only be tested with attempts to falsify it. I hope they try.  
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Figure 1. The Dual Encoding Interference explanation of low trait to misinformation 
associations. An illustration of how trait-like individual differences, like absorption, often 
reveal low associations with false memories in misinformation research.  
